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The quality of scientific evidence in government heavily depends upon the independent assessment of
research. Pressure from those commissioning the research may pose a threat to scientific integrity
and rigorous policy-making. Edward Page reports that whilst there is strong evidence of
government leaning, this leaning appears to have little systematic impact on the nature of the
conclusions that researchers reach due to the presence of disincentives within academia and
research administrators within government.
Do governments lean too much on the researchers who evaluate their policies? One can think of
one reason why they would: to get good publicity. And one can think of a reason why researchers
would give in to such pressure: to get contracts. But there are also plausible reasons to expect government not to
lean on researchers: whether government genuinely wants to draw lessons from research or just wants good PR it
needs to be rigorous rather than obsequious. Moreover researchers might not be expected to give in to pressure
since their reputations are built on independence and can be destroyed by evidence or suspicions that their
professional opinions are for sale.
The issue is an important one even though the signs are that the
Coalition government is not as keen as New Labour was on securing
evaluation evidence by commissioning research. If evaluation research
is generated under pressure from sponsors intending to produce results
that suit them, then the nature of this pressure and the responses of
those facing it are at the very least relevant to our assessment of the
quality of that evidence. To examine government leaning and researcher
buckling we conducted a study, based on a web survey of 204
academics who had done research work for government since 2005,
supplemented by interviews with 22 researchers.
The strongest evidence of government influence can be found in the
very initial stages of the research: setting up the research design. Some
of our respondents offered comments along these lines:
… the real place where research is politically managed is in the selection of topics/areas to be
researched and then in the detailed specification. It is there that they control the kinds of questions
that are to be asked. This gives plenty of opportunity to avoid difficult results.
When asked, nearly half of our respondents (45 per cent) pointed out that “the government organisation(s) had a
clear idea of the precise questions the research should examine” with 27 per cent suggesting “the government
organisation(s) had a broad idea of what the research should examine and left the definition of the precise research
questions to me/us”, 26 per cent indicated the development of the research questions was a joint effort with
government and 2 per cent did not know.
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Whether government intervened in the research design or not appears to have a significant influence on whether the
research produced was supportive of government policy or not, as reported by our respondents. Of those who were
left to develop the research questions, only 23 per cent produced a report broadly supportive of government policy
compared with 50 per cent of those writing reports.  When government was involved in developing research
questions, whether alone or in conjunction with researchers, their reports were substantially more likely to be
supportive.
At no other stage in the research did government pressure have an impact on how supportive the final report turned
out to be.  This was not for want of trying. For instance,   52 per cent reported they were asked to make significant
changes to their draft reports (i.e. affecting the interpretation of findings or the weight given to them). And some of
our respondents elaborated along these lines: “There was a lot of dialogue back and forth at the end between us
and the Department … before it was published to ensure they did not look bad. They wanted certain wording
changed so that it was most beneficial from a PR and marketing point of view; and they wanted certain things
emphasised and certain things omitted”. Yet such pressure seems to have had little effect on whether the end result
was a favourable or critical report. If anything, those asked to make changes were more likely to produce critical
reports (though this finding does not approach statistical significance).
One must be careful about what we mean by “government” influence. There are at least four distinct groups within a
ministry, each with different relationships with researchers. First there are the officials who are responsible for
research, possibly because they are researchers themselves.  Where mentioned, these seem to have the best
relationships with researchers and appear most likely to share a belief in the importance of programme evaluation
objectives in research. A second group is made up of “policy people” — officials with the task of looking after policy
within the department, whether to amend, defend, expand or contract it.  One respondent summarised concisely her
view of the difference between these two groups: “the research manager places a lot of emphasis on research
integrity, whereas the policy teams may have their own ideological or policy motives”.
The third group is the ministerial political leadership. Our survey evidence suggests unsurprisingly that they are
highly likely, in the view of our respondents, to downvalue programme evaluation objectives of research as only 4
per cent of respondents (N=182) agreed with the proposition that “Ministers are prepared to act on evidence
provided by social research even when it runs counter to their views”.  The professionals and service providers in
the programmes being evaluated make up a fourth group.  Their views might be sought on an ad hoc basis as the
research develops or they might be part of “stakeholder” or “expert” steering groups. Several respondents and
interviewees mentioned the role of service providers as a source of constraint on their research findings.  One
argued
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We met regularly with the Head of Research in the [Department] and also occasionally with their
policymaking colleagues.  One difficulty with these meetings was that they insisted representatives of
the [organisation running programme being evaluated] attended. This made it quite difficult to discuss
the report openly because these peoples’ livelihoods depended on the scheme. My part of the report
was critical of the [programme] and I thought it inappropriate for the [department] to invite these
people along.  I felt it hindered honest and open discussion.
Overall there is sufficient evidence here to suggest that governments do lean on researchers. However, for the most
part this leaning appears to have little systematic impact on the nature of the conclusions that researchers reach.
The most effective constraint appears to be found when government specifies the nature of the research to be done
at the outset. No other form of constraint has as powerful an effect on the degree to which the overall conclusions
the researchers reach support government policy.
Our findings suggest that there are two main forces that reduce the impact of government “leaning” on the character
and quality of the research reports.  The first is the persistence of disincentives within academic career structures to
compromise scientific integrity for the sake of securing government contracts.  Our findings point to this, but we also
have to note the shortcomings of our evidence base in this respect: it is based on academics reporting on their own
behaviour. The second is the existence within government of a body of research administrators given significant
responsibility for developing and managing research and coming in between policy officials and politicians on the
one hand and the researchers on the other. In the absence of such a body of research administrators, the pressures
on researchers to produce politically congenial research would likely be far stronger.  Without the disincentives to
compromise scientific integrity, one would have to have serious concern for the value of commissioned research.
This research by the LSE GV314 Group was recently published in the journal Public Administration . GV314
Empirical Research in Government is a final year undergraduate course in the Government Department at
LSE.  With a group of up to 15 students, Edward Page conducts a separate research project each year. More details
on the project can be found here.
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